I wish to analyse the concept of 'people's war' primarily from the perspective of warfare, particularly the wars of 20th-century China. Earlier this morning, Dean Li Shenming also mentioned the notions of 'the people above all,' the concept of 'the people,' and the category of war. These held special significance in the 20th century and also touch upon divergences in historical understanding.
The first issue is to examine the position of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the global Anti-Fascist War within 20th-century history over a longer timeframe. Chronologically, the two world wars were massive in scale, technologically advanced, and resulted in unprecedented casualties. However, the imperialist nature of World War I makes it difficult to truly distinguish it from many 19th-century wars. As discussed this morning, colonialism and fascism share a twin-like relationship.
From the perspective of China's revolution, the timeline begins with the Opium War of 1840, followed by the two Opium Wars waged by the Anglo-French allied forces, the Sino-French War, the First Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Russo-Japanese War, the September 18th Incident and Japan's occupation of Northeast China, culminating in the full-scale invasion of China triggered by the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Following 1945, US intervention in the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, the US blockade of the Taiwan Strait in 1950, and the Vietnam War from 1955 to 1975 these events collectively form a prolonged, continuous process: the imperialist aggression, interference, and occupation of oppressed nations and peoples like China, Korea, and Vietnam.
Crucially, imperialist military expansion was not only driven by economic plunder but also precipitated a transformation in China's economic structure. It not only gave rise to a comprador system and bureaucratic capital compatible with colonial economics, but also produced more significant economic and political forces resisting imperialism. These included the national industries and national bourgeoisie mentioned by Mao Zedong and numerous modern historical works, particularly the Chinese proletariat working in enterprises directly operated by imperialists, as well as in bureaucratic capitalist and national bourgeois enterprises. To sustain its aggression, imperialism exploited Chinese peasants through unequal exchange, bankrupting them and creating hundreds of millions of impoverished peasants who constituted 70% of the rural population. Imperialism also forged millions of new-style intellectuals distinct from traditional literati or scholar-officials. These groups became crucial pillars of resistance against Japanese imperialism during World War II, particularly in China's War of Resistance Against Japan.
When discussing the category of 'the people,' it is crucial to recognise that 'the people' are not merely the general population but a nascent force that evolves historically. Precisely for this reason, China's War of Resistance Against Japan and World War II encompassed content distinct from that of World War I. The First World War and The Second World War differ in this respect, for only during the Second World War (specifically within China's War of Resistance Against Japan) did revolutionary, national liberation, and anti-fascist united front resistance emerge as integral components of the war effort, elements absent from the First World War. Thus, in an era defined by war and revolution, the most crucial question when examining the Second World War concerns the relationship between war and revolution. To understand 20th-century China's transformations through war itself, one must examine the distinctive characteristics of China's warfare during this period.
The Northern Expedition, the Land Revolution War, the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the Liberation War all differed significantly from earlier conflicts like the Opium Wars, the Sino-French War, and the First Sino-Japanese War. The core distinction lies in the fact that the former were wars that organised revolution within the framework of war mobilisation. Without acknowledging the dual relationship between 20th-century warfare and its twin revolution, it is difficult to comprehend and discuss the wars of this era. The victory we now attribute to the anti-fascist war was fundamentally grounded in wars that advanced revolution through warfare. These conflicts were not merely about resisting foreign aggression but simultaneously driving social revolution. They were not wars to establish ordinary, traditional states, but rather wars to forge revolutionary states through revolutionary warfare – wars that created new popular subjects. Throughout this process, a new popular subject emerged, uniting the national liberation war with the international anti-fascist struggle.
Therefore, while we commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory in the War Against Fascism and the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, placing them within the same historical framework, we can still discern distinct historical forces at work within this shared history. This was a war that achieved national liberation through domestic revolutionary struggle while resonating with the international socialist movement. Precisely for this reason, the wars that occurred after the founding of the People's Republic of China, such as the Korean War and the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, were not traditional defence wars in the conventional sense, though they certainly held significant national defence implications. Rather, they were wars of international alliance grounded in the historical foundations of the 20th-century revolutionary alliance and the anti-fascist alliance, or, to put it another way, they were wars of international alliance within that historical context. It is against this backdrop that we must pose our questions.The People's Republic of China formed along this trajectory may exhibit distinct characteristics in its categories of nation, ethnicity, sovereignty, political party, people, and class, as well as in its state form, compared to its predecessors. From the Soviets formed in the early 1930s to the later birth of the People's Republic of China, how did organisation and mobilisation transform peasants into a vital revolutionary force or a political class? How should we understand sovereignty, sovereignty disputes, and Third World solidarity within the context of international alliances and wars – even broader movements like the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement that emerged under new global hegemonic structures? These conditions differed from earlier wars yet remained interconnected.
On one hand, wars from the Opium Wars to 20th-century imperialist conflicts exhibit strong continuity. On the other, the warfare patterns of the 20th century – particularly during World War II, or even earlier from the Northern Expedition onward – differed fundamentally from their predecessors. The core distinction lies in this being a war that integrated revolution and warfare. I consider this the first point. It was precisely on this foundation that the uniquely Chinese concept of 'People's War' emerged.
The fundamental conditions for people's war, I believe, carry dual significance. First, as we discuss the anti-fascist war and China's fourteen-year history of resistance against Japanese aggression today, a consensus has gradually emerged. Research also indicates: why did China and Russia suffer such immense sacrifices during World War II, making such a colossal contribution to the victory over fascism? This involves a duality: on one hand, victory; on the other, sacrifice. The reason for such immense sacrifice is that both the revolution and this war unfolded in relatively underdeveloped regions where capitalism was not sufficiently advanced. Within this region, two of the most significant concepts of the 20th century were proposed. The first was Lenin's concept of 'the weak link.' He argued that in a world order characterised by competition among multiple powers, the international system would inevitably exhibit weak links. Lenin pointed out that international capitalism was speculative in nature. Its monumental achievements had not yet matured to the point of full international cooperation, remaining hindered by capitalist groups exploiting national sentiments and policies to pursue special interests. Thus, against the backdrop of Western powers attacking China and the Soviet Union, unique weak links emerged.
In the Soviet Union, this became the foundational analytical condition for revolution within a single nation and the establishment of a socialist state. In the Chinese Revolution, Mao Zedong analysed the possibility emerging within Chinese society, under the framework of international capitalism, due to internal power imbalances in the cracks of. These two types of weak links – one international, one domestic – required various strategic analyses to generate genuine, viable forces. When discussing the victory in World War II, the triumph over fascism, we must consider why victory was possible despite facing a stronger enemy. This requires analysing the history of the Chinese Revolution.
Before the outbreak of World War II, during the interwar period, the first wave of base area construction, Red Army development, and the establishment of revolutionary governments had already commenced following the failure of the Northern Expedition. Today, Professor Lu Tonglin specifically highlighted the struggles in regions like Yan'an and Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, which were extensions of the early revolutionary base area experience. Without the early Red Army and its northward advance, this would have been impossible. In other words, it required new revolutionary governments, an organised army already under Communist leadership, and the integration of that army with social mobilisation across different local regions to gain popular support. This was intertwined with unique economic, political, social, and even cultural conditions.
Thus, on one hand, analysing imperialism's unevenness and the divisions and contradictions within its domestic ruling structures served as the premise for revolutionary politics and strategy. On the other hand, the new mobilising forces required for the war's advancement – including the formation of the Communist Party, organised armies, guerrilla units, and the support of ordinary peasants who had undergone a degree of land revolution – all constituted the prerequisites for revolution. It was precisely under these conditions that the new political forces emerging during World War II and China's War of Resistance Against Japan took shape.
This morning, Professor Wu Enyuan mentioned the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army and the North China region. All these areas built upon the foundation of existing Red Zones established during the First Domestic Revolution period, accumulating experience and developing organised armies and Party organisations. Only under such conditions could the fundamental prerequisites for the subsequent victories in the anti-fascist war and the War of Resistance Against Japan be truly established. I consider this a crucial point.
In my view, the most significant political concepts proposed by Mao Zedong in the 20th century – including his so-called 'four magic weapons': armed struggle, the mass line, the united front, and Party building – can all be interpreted within the framework of 'people's war.' It is in this sense that the 20th-century war was not a purely military concept but a political category encompassing diversity. Thus, under the unique conditions of 20th-century China, people's war was in fact a process of creating a new political subject, as well as a process of creating the political structures and forms of self-expression that corresponded to this political subject.
In the people's war, the representative relationship of modern political parties underwent a fundamental transformation. We all know that the Communist Party of China was indeed influenced by the Soviet Union and the Comintern in its early days. In the early 1920s, its main members were still primarily intellectuals. Through the Great Revolution, the first united front with the Kuomintang, and its integration with the peasant and workers' movements, the Party underwent a significant transformation. After the failure of the Great Revolution, when the CPC retreated to backward bases such as the Jiangxi Soviet Area, a new popular force emerged, which was primarily composed of peasants and politically united through an alliance of workers and peasants. This gave rise to and transformed the political landscape, including the establishment of border region governments, Soviets, political parties, peasant associations, and labour unions.
Thus, between 1925 and 1926, the Kuomintang's policy of allying with Russia and the Communist Party led to joint Kuomintang-Communist efforts in the peasant and labour movements. The Guangzhou Peasant Movement Institute, led by Mao Zedong, was a direct product of this peasant movement.The Kuomintang's primary political innovations during the Northern Expedition period centred on two points: first, breaking away from the old warlords to establish a party army; second, collaborating with the Communist Party in peasant and worker movements to complement the Northern Expedition with mass mobilisation. Thus, the concept of the 'party army,' armed revolution against armed counterrevolution, was not originally invented by the Communist Party but represented a shared innovation of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party during their revolutionary phase, influenced by the Comintern.
However, after 1927, the Kuomintang gradually abandoned these social movements. With the integration of party and state, the political character of the military significantly declined. Precisely against this backdrop, for the Communist Party, a transformation of the party was unthinkable without the people's war that gradually developed after the failure of the Northern Expedition. This is particularly crucial, as the integration of the party with the military within the people's war constitutes its first defining feature.
The second characteristic is the integration of the party with the red regime, which stands as one of the most vital political legacies of 20th-century China, retaining its vitality to this day. Through the land revolution during the People's War, the party forged ties with the peasantry as the mainstay of the masses. Simultaneously, the party's relationships with other political parties, social strata, and their political representatives underwent transformation, a shift particularly pronounced during the War of Resistance Against Japan. The Second United Front proposed during the War of Resistance not only encompassed workers and peasants but also included the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and even those strata among the landlords and big bourgeoisie unwilling to collaborate with Japan or become traitors. All these elements could be incorporated into the united front. These experiences remind us that people's war created a type of political party fundamentally different from any in history. I have previously described this as dual-natured: on one hand, it functions as a super-party due to its highly centralised leadership; on the other, it possesses elements of a supra-party because of its close ties to mass movements and popular campaigns. Thus, I term such a party a 'super-party' – one that incorporates supra-party elements, meaning a super-party closely linked to mass movements, and one that is tightly integrated with the military and the state.
Second, people's war also forged unique forms of warfare. Following the failure of the Great Revolution, early bases like those established after the Autumn Harvest Uprising and Nanchang Uprising saw land reform and armed struggle become the fundamental means for transforming party politics into mass movements. The central task of the Jinggangshan struggle thus shifted to land reform and state-building under revolutionary war conditions. The integration of the Party and the military, the Party's linkage with the peasant movement and land reform through the military, the Party and the Soviet-area governments under its leadership managing economic life, and the cultural campaigns the Party conducted among the masses. These not only altered the specific content and central tasks of the revolution but also, through the multifaceted integration of the political party, the military, the government, and the peasant movement, created an entirely new political entity. This constituted the political foundation of people's war. These political processes unfolding during the war endowed people's war with characteristics distinct from other forms of warfare. Mao Zedong stated that 'soldiers and civilians are the foundation of victory,' meaning the integration of the military with the common people is the bedrock of triumph. This proposition encapsulates the general principle of people's war: only by mobilising and relying on the masses can war be waged.
Third, it requires not only a strong regular army but also local armed forces and militia. The concept of 'soldiers and civilians' signifies a political process closely tied to military struggle, centred on land reform and state-building. Therefore, one of the key outcomes of people's war is the establishment of the red regime. The primary forms of the red regime were the Border Region governments and Border Region Soviets. These entities not only managed the organisational structures of daily life but also drew upon historical experiences of state governance from both China and abroad. However, this form of government differed fundamentally from the bourgeois state in the conventional sense. Through sustained political and war mobilisation, it cultivated political consciousness and class consciousness, thereby organising these processes to generate a new political form.
Under conditions of people's war, the Communist Party of China and the base area governments addressed not merely military issues but also the organisation of daily life and ordinary labourers. This gave rise to the mass line for the Party and government. Its core tenets were: first, serving the interests of the broad masses was the starting point and ultimate goal of the Party's work; second, the border region government serves as the organizer of people's livelihoods. Only by diligently resolving mass issues, tangibly improving people's lives, and earning their trust in the border region government can the masses be mobilised to join the Red Army, support the war effort, and defeat encirclement campaigns. Thus, people's war is not merely a method of effectively eliminating enemies through military struggle, but also involves addressing the core issues constituting people's lives – land, labour, daily necessities, women, schools, market trade, and even currency and finance.
The mutual interpenetration and transformation between military affairs and daily life became the core issue of people's war. Thus, Mao Zedong repeatedly reminded Communists that to gain the masses' support and secure their full commitment to the front lines, they must live among the people, mobilise their enthusiasm, care about their hardships, sincerely work for their interests, and resolve their production and livelihood issues, including salt, rice, housing, clothing, and childbirth. He asserted that the mass line was the fundamental strategy of people's war, the policy of the party, and the very means of reconstructing the party. On one hand, without organisation, we would not know where the masses were; on the other, without the process of integrating with the masses and learning from them, the organisation would lack vitality and become detached from the people.
Against this unique backdrop, the people's war also self-reconstructed new forms of political leadership and party structures. This explains why, in the wars of the 20th century, the Chinese revolution, and particularly the Communist Party, gained political supremacy despite being militarily outnumbered. This supremacy extended beyond the political sphere to encompass cultural leadership.As Mao Zedong noted in his 1940s essay 'On New Democracy,' two miracles defined China's revolution: first, the Communist Party's deepening of the land revolution under wartime conditions; second, the advancement of cultural revolution – where the cultural left, represented by Lu Xun, seized political leadership despite being in the minority. Lu Xun's concept of 'mass literature for the national revolutionary war' embodies, in my view, the literature of people's war, mutually reinforcing this struggle.
However, World War II, particularly China's War of Resistance Against Japan, featured one most prominent aspect distinct from earlier wars: the formation of the United Front Against Japanese Aggression. From the September 18 Incident of 1931 to the Xi'an Incident of 1936, the groundwork for this united front was gradually laid. This front not only transcended the early European revolutionary model focused solely on the proletariat, placing the broad masses of workers and peasants at the core of the revolution, but also incorporated the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and even segments of the big bourgeoisie and landlords willing to resist aggression. Together, they formed a new popular subject. The questions of leadership and the united front were two coexisting aspects.
This advocacy and practice of the united front existed not only during the War of Resistance Against Japan in the 20th century but also in the War of Liberation. We observed the criticism of the Kuomintang by various democratic parties and their gradual collaboration with the Communist Party of China. After the 1950s, with the convening of the Bandung Conference, new relationships emerged on the international level: alliances within the international anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movement, alliances with non-socialist countries, and alliances with progressive forces within imperialist nations.
As Professor Lu Tonglin mentioned earlier, elements among Japanese prisoners of war who participated in the anti-war alliance already existed during the War of Resistance Against Japan. After the war, some of them became a new political force in the peace movement and in promoting Sino-Japanese friendship. From our current discussion of the historical position of the Global South, we can draw valuable lessons and fresh inspiration from the wars, revolutions, and the strategic tactics they shaped throughout the 20th century. Based on today's conditions, we can develop new opportunities and insights for the vital cause of achieving global peace.
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